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I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), we
now have access to a multitude of devices with advanced
capabilities that allow us to remotely collect information or
control physical objects. Examples of such systems include
alarm systems, entertainment devices, vehicles, smart build-
ings, to name a few. At the same time, smartphones and
wearables have also advanced in their sensing and compu-
tational capabilities, which enable many new applications and
usage scenarios. While smartphones are already widely used,
wearables are still growing in popularity with the arrival
of new applications, including the ability to identify a user
to third party services, store sensitive user information (i.e.,
passwords, credit card information), unlock vehicles, access
phones and other paired devices, manage financial payments,
monitor or track individuals (e.g., child monitoring or fall
detection), and assess an individual’s health and fitness.
However, wearables also raise new challenges, specifically
in terms of security. Unauthorized access of a wearable can
enable access to other sensitive IoT objects, which poses
a significant risk [1]. Unauthorized users could also access
data on the wearables, e.g., many applications and services
provided by a wearable depend on sensor and user data
stored on the device. Another concern is the reliability (i.e.,
trustworthiness) of the physiological and activity data collected
by wearables, e.g., many healthcare providers and researchers
rely on wearables to monitor their patients or study participants
remotely, where users may be tempted to give their own
devices to others, e.g., to reach a prescribed amount of activity
or to contribute the required amount of data to maintain
compliance and receive financial incentives. Therefore, there
is a need for robust and accurate authentication mechanisms
specifically for wearable device users.
Existing wearable device authentication mechanisms are
often knowledge-based regular PIN locks or pattern locks [2],
which suffer from a scalability issue [3], i.e., with an increas-
ing reliance on protected devices, a user is often flooded with
passwords or PIN requests to obtain access to various data
and services. Knowledge-based approaches also require users
to interact with the display, which may either be inconvenient
or even completely absent in many wearables [1], [3]. Many
times, users opt to completely disable security mechanisms
out of convenience. Furthermore, knowledge-based approaches
suffer from observation attacks such as shoulder surfing [3].
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Therefore, in recent years, biometric-based solutions have
been proposed, since they provide opportunities for implicit
authentication by removing direct user involvement or atten-
tion [1], [3]. A market intelligence firm has also predicted that
annual biometric hardware and software revenue will grow at
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 22.9% from $2.4
billion in 2016 to $15.1 billion worldwide by 2025 [4], which
further provides evidence that there is an opportunity to utilize
biometric-based authentication.
However, biometric-based authentication also has chal-
lenges and shortcomings, specifically in terms of accuracy and
usability. For example, behavioral biometric-based approaches
such as gait or gesture analysis often fail to authenticate a user
during sedentary periods [1]. Due to the limited computational
capabilities and energy resources, most traditional user authen-
tication approaches, e.g., using fingerprints, voice, breathing
patterns, keystroke dynamics, head or arm movements, gait,
electroencephalography (EEG), and electrocardiograms (ECG)
are often not suitable for wearable devices. Furthermore, low-
cost sensors in wearables may be less accurate (leading to
noisy data recordings) or collect recordings very infrequently
(e.g., only once per minute). The limited display sizes of
wearables add another constraint that limits the choices of
authentication mechanisms.
The main contribution of this paper is an implicit wearable
device user authentication approach using three different types
of biometric data: behavioral biometrics (step counts), physio-
logical biometrics (heart rate), and hybrid biometrics (calorie
burn and metabolic equivalent of a task or MET), all of which
are easily obtainable in many state-of-the-art wearables. Our
approach is to authenticate a user based on coarse-grained
(i.e., one sample per minute instead of multiple samples per
second or millisecond) processed (i.e., not raw) biometric
data. We train and test different authentication models with
different feature sets using a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier, which was found to be the most accurate in our
previous work [5]. Our analysis using data from over 400 Fitbit
users shows that our multi-biometric-based implicit approach
is able to authenticate subjects with an average accuracy
of about .93 (sedentary) and .90 (non-sedentary). We also
find that the hybrid biometrics (i.e., calorie burn and MET)
perform the best, whereas the behavioral biometrics (i.e., step
counts) do not have a significant impact on authentication
even during non-sedentary periods. Using error analysis we
demonstrate the trade-off between usability and security of
our authentication approach.
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2TABLE I
CANDIDATE FEATURE SET CONSISTING OF 27 FEATURES COMPUTED FROM EACH OF THE FOUR BIOMETRICS
mean (µ), standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), coefficient of variation (cov), maximum (max), minimum (min), range (ran), coefficient of
range (coran), percentiles (25th (p25), 50th (p50), 75th (p75), and 95th (p95)), inter quartile range (iqr), coefficient of inter quartile range
(coi), mean absolute deviation (mad µ), median absolute deviation (mad Mdn), mean frequency (f µ), median frequency (f Mdn),
power (P ), number of peaks (np), energy (E), root mean square (rms), peak magnitude to rms ratio (p2rms), root sum of squares (rss),
signal to noise ratio (snr), skewness (γ), kurtosis (κ)
II. APPROACH
NetHealth Study Dataset: The NetHealth mobile crowd
sensing (MCS) study [5]–[18] began at the University of Notre
Dame with over 400 freshmen (age 18 ± 1 years) recruited
from the 2015 class. Subjects were instructed to continuously
wear a Fitbit Charge HR device, which provided minute-level
heart rate, calorie burn, metabolic equivalent of task or MET,
physical activity level/intensity (e.g., sedentary, light, fair,
and high), step count, sleep status, and self-recorded activity
labels. These collected data can be divided into three biometric
groups: behavioral (e.g., step counts, activity level/intensity),
physiological (e.g., heart rate) and hybrid (e.g., calorie burn,
MET) biometrics.
Pre-Processing and Feature Computation: We first remove
periods of activity minutes that do not match with periods of
heart rate measurements. A similar filtering approach is ap-
plied for calorie burn and MET. Next, we segment continuous
biometrics into five-minute non-overlapping windows starting
from a change of activity levels. Each window contains five
consecutive samples recorded at the same activity level. Table I
presents the candidate feature set. We compute 108 features for
each window, when considering all four biometrics together.
For non-sedentary periods, we also consider the activity level
(i.e., light, fair, and high) as an additional feature. Each
biometric is referred to by its initial: “C” (calorie burn), “S”
(step counts), “M” (MET), and “H” (heart rate). Combinations
of these letters are used to represent the corresponding combi-
nations of the biometrics, e.g., “CH” represents a combination
of calorie burn and heart rate.
Feature Selection: First, we apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS)-test to select significant features from the candidate
feature sets consisting of 27 features from each of the four
biometrics. Then, we apply two separate approaches to reduce
the feature count – (1) remove redundant features using the
Pearson Correlation (PC)-based approach and (2) reduce the
feature count using Standard Deviation (SD)-based feature
selection approach.
Authentication Models: We use: (1) the binary Quadratic
Support Vector Machine (q-svm), i.e., SVM with a second
order polynomial kernel function defined as K(xi, xj) =
(1 + γxTi xj)
d and (2) the unary Gaussian Support Vector
Machine (g-svm), i.e., SVM with the Gaussian or Radial
Basis Function (RBF) defined as K(xi, xj) = exp(−γxTi xj),
where kernel scale parameter γ = 1, degree d = 2, and
xi and xj are two feature vectors/windows. We also set the
miss-classification cost/penalty, C = 1. We perform wearable
device user authentication separately for sedentary and non-
sedentary periods.
Train-Test Sets: For each feature set with N subjects, we
Fig. 1. FPR and FNR variations with changing outlier thresholds.
build N separate models, one for each subject. When using
the binary q-svm classifier, we train a model with 75% data
of one subject (positive class) and 75% data from the rest of
the N − 1 subjects (negative class). However, when using the
unary (i.e., 1-class) g-svm classifier, we train a model using
a subject’s own data with a certain percentage of data being
considered as outliers. For both types of classifiers, we test
a model on of the 25% data both from positive and negative
classes. In all cases, we use balanced datasets.
Performance Measures: In addition to standard Accuracy
(ACC), False Positive Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate
(FNR), we also use the Equal Error Rate (EER), which is
defined as the point when FNR and FPR are equal, i.e., a trade-
off between the two error measures (i.e., FNR and FPR). Note
that literature often also uses False Acceptance Rate (FAR)
and False Rejection Rate (FRR), which are exactly the same
as FPR and FNR, respectively.
III. RESULTS
A. Comparing Biometrics and Feature Selection Approaches
Table II summarizes the findings when applying q-svm on
the three feature selection approaches. In the table, for each
feature selection approach, we present the best biometrics,
i.e., biometric combinations that optimize feature count and
classification accuracy. Also, n, N , and W stands for the
number of features in a feature set, the number of subjects
used for training-testing, and set of random windows picked
from a subject, respectively. In the table, we observe that the
KS- and SD-based approaches achieve similar performance.
In Table II we observe that in general hybrid biometrics (i.e.,
“C” and “M”) perform better than other behavioral (“S”) and
physiological (“H”) biometrics, which happens because hybrid
biometrics are derived from both behavioral and physiological
biometrics in addition to demographic data such as weight and
age of a user.
B. Binary versus Unary Classification
The unary classifiers in Table II are built without consider-
ing any outlier (i.e., 0% outlier). We observe that the unary
3Fig. 2. FNR, FPR, and ACC variations with varying probability thresholds
for 5 minute windows using the KS-approach with CM .
models achieve performance close to binary classification
models for the KS- and SD-based approaches during sedentary
periods. However, for non-sedentary periods, the difference be-
tween the two classification models is relatively high compared
to sedentary periods. This is probably due to the variations of
window counts across the three non-sedentary activity levels
of individuals. In Figure 1 we observe that FPR goes below
.05 with ≈10% and ≈30% outliers during sedentary and non-
sedentary period models, respectively. Therefore, these could
be used as appropriate outlier thresholds while designing unary
models.
C. Error Analysis
In this section, we take into account the confidence level
of a prediction in terms of a posterior probability, which
indicates the likelihood of the prediction coming from a
particular class. In Figure 2 we observe that with the increase
of the probability threshold, FPR starts dropping sharply, while
FNR and ACC increase steadily. After .9 probability all three
measures change sharply. At a probability threshold of ≈.95,
we obtain an EER of ≈.05. When FPR drops to .02, FNR
increases to ≈.1. At that point ACC increases above .97.
TABLE II
AUTHENTICATION SUMMARY
Feature selection approach
Sedentary Non-sedentary
KS PC SD KS PC SD
Best
biometrics CM CMH CM CM CMH CSMH
n 49 53 20 27 21 30
N 412 411 415 413 413 412
|W | 544 637 370 331 331 372
Binary Classification
µ(ACC) .93 .86 .93 .90 .86 .88
σ(ACC) .03 .04 .04 .04 .05 .05
µ(FNR) .04 .15 .03 .06 .10 .09
σ(FNR) .03 .05 .03 .04 .05 .04
µ(FPR) .10 .14 .11 .14 .18 .15
σ(FPR) .05 .05 .06 .05 .06 .07
Unary Classification
µ(ACC) .88 .76 .90 .74 .64 .68
σ(ACC) .07 .06 .07 .06 .07 .07
µ(FNR) .14 .27 .09 .16 .07 .07
σ(FNR) .08 .11 .07 .07 .04 .03
µ(FPR) .11 .21 .12 .36 .64 .56
σ(FPR) .16 .16 .16 .13 .14 .14
For sedentary periods we observe similar patterns. This way
a trade-off can be made between FPR and FNR to balance
security (in terms of FPR) and usability (in terms of FNR)
of an implicit authentication system for wearable device users
depending on the application scenario and user preference.
IV. DISCUSSION
To our best knowledge, our work is the first to use three
different types of less informative coarse-grained processed
biometric data (i.e., behavioral, physiological, and hybrid)
to accurately authenticate the wearable-users implicitly dur-
ing both sedentary and non-sedentary periods. Our detailed
analysis shows the effectiveness and importance of different
biometrics and feature selection approaches.
Our activity-level-based models are applicable to any un-
known activity type since all types of activities belong to
one of the four major activity levels used in our modeling.
Homogeneity of subjects and similarity of their biometrics
might have negatively impacted our results. Degradation of
performance during non-sedentary periods indicates the need
for better modeling, e.g., separate models for different activity
levels, which our current dataset does not support due to the
lack of sufficient numbers of highly active samples.
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